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THE EXCLUSION OF DUPLICATIVE PROPOSALS UNDER 
RULE 14A-8(I)(11) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 14a-8 (the Rule) allows shareholders to include proposals in a 
company’s proxy materials.1 The Rule, however, also contains thirteen 
substantive grounds for excluding a proposal. Specifically, subsection 
(i)(11) allows a company to exclude a proposal that “substantially dupli-
cates” a previously submitted proposal.2  
Duplicative proposals need not be identical.3 Instead, they only 
must have the same “principal thrust” or “principal focus,”4 or must ad-
dress the same “core issue.”5 Proposals deemed duplicative may, there-
fore, vary in terms and scope, and may even be phrased differently.6 Alt-
hough narrowly interpreted and rarely used in its early history, subsec-
tion (i)(11) has been interpreted more broadly and applied to proposals 
with substantial and material differences. This has been particularly clear 
with respect to proposals seeking disclosure of corporate lobbying activi-
ties.  
This paper will address the adoption of, and justification for, this 
subsection. The paper will focus on the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC or Commission) Staff interpretation of this subsection, and 
the underlying process of allowing companies to exclude shareholder 
proposals as duplicative. Since the adoption of the Rule, the Staff has 
broadened the scope in permitting exclusions.  
II. ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF RULE 14A-8(I)(11) 
Early versions of Rule 14a-8 did not address the issue of duplicative 
proposals. The SEC Commission did express concern with practices that 
added costs to the proxy process while providing little value to the com-
pany or shareholders.7 Perhaps as a result, the Staff relied on an informal 
position allowing for the exclusion of proposals viewed as moot.8  
  
 1. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8 (2011).  
 2. Id. 
 3. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 28726 (Feb. 1, 1993) 
[hereinafter Pacific Gas]. 
 4. Chevron Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 160560 (Feb. 21, 2012) [hereinafter 
Chevron].  
 5. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 7326033 (Jan. 28, 2015) [herein-
after Kraft Food Grp.]; see also Abbott Labs., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 260369 (Feb. 4, 
2004). 
 6. See Wells Fargo & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 494127 (Feb. 8, 2011). 
 7. See Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 9432 (Dec. 22, 1971) (Concern 
arose over the practice of shareholders submitting a vast number of identical proposals without 
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The Commission amended Rule 14a-8 to explicitly allow for the 
omission of duplicative proposals in 1976. The Rule permitted compa-
nies to exclude proposals that “substantially duplicate[d]” those “previ-
ously submitted” by another shareholder.9 The provision only allowed 
for the exclusion of the second proposal and applied only when the com-
pany agreed to include the first.10 The exclusion was designed to benefit 
shareholders by eliminating “the possibility of shareholders having to 
consider two or more substantially identical proposals submitted to an 
issuer by proponents acting independently of each other.”11 Omission 
was therefore permitted when voting on the second proposal served “no 
useful purpose.”12 
Substantial duplication required that the proposals be indistinguish-
able in both legal and practical effect.13 The exclusion, therefore, applied 
  
attending the meeting. The Commission addressed the concern by emphasizing the obligation to 
submit proposals in “good faith.”). 
 8. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders (S7-643), Exchange Act Release No. 9393 (July 7, 1976) 
(explaining that exclusion “would formalize a ground for omission that is not mentioned in the 
current Rule but reasonably has been implied therefrom.”); see also Adoption of Amendments 
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No 12999 (Nov. 22, 1976) [here-
inafter Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders] (In adopting the exclu-
sion, the Commission noted that the ground for omission had “existed solely on an informal basis in 
the past.”). 
 9. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, supra note 8 (“Spe-
cifically, the new subparagraph provides that the management may omit a proposal that is substan-
tially duplicative of a proposal submitted by another proponent which the management intends to 
include in its proxy materials.”).  
 10. See The Timken Co., SEC No-Action Letter 1986 WL 66485 (Jan. 6, 1986) (The Staff has 
concurred that “paragraph (c)(11) permits the omission of a proposal and any statement in support 
thereof from a company’s proxy statement and form of proxy if it is substantially duplicative of a 
proposal ‘previously submitted to the issuer by another proponent . . . .' In the absence of the re-
quirement, another shareholder might learn of a prior proposal of which it did not approve, draft a 
similar proposal more to its liking and have its proposal substituted for the prior proposal. In a simul-
taneous receipt situation, such potential for manipulation does not exist, and paragraph (c)(11) 
should apply to permit the omission of one proposal that is substantially duplicative of another 
proposal.”).  
 11. Continental Airlines, SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 9901 (March 12, 1975) (“After 
consideration of the foregoing information, this Division has determined not to recommend any 
enforcement action to the Commission if Mr. Armstrong's proposal is omitted from the company's 
proxy material. As you indicate, his proposal is substantially similar to a proposal previously submit-
ted to the company by Mr. Korba which the management intends to include in the company's proxy 
material. Although Rule 14a–8 does not deal specifically with a matter of this nature, the Division 
believes it is reasonable to take the position that where two substantially similar shareholder pro-
posals relating to the same meeting of security holders are submitted to a company by two independ-
ent stockholders, no useful purpose would be served by including both such proposals in the compa-
ny's proxy material. That is, both proposals are essentially the same, and it would be redundant to 
include each in the proxy material.”). 
 12. Id. (“[T]he Division believes it is reasonable to take the position that where two substan-
tially similar shareholder proposals relating to the same meeting of security holders are submitted to 
a company by two independent stockholders, no useful purpose would be served by including both 
such proposals in the company's proxy material. That is, both proposals are essentially the same, and 
it would be redundant to include each in the proxy material.”).  
 13. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 13728 (Feb. 7, 1977) 
(“The two forms of the proposal are identical except that one would request the Board of Directors 
to establish a specified policy while the other would amend the Company's by-laws to add such 
policy as a by-law. The proponents have expressed in such letters their preference for the proposal in 
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to proposals considered “identical.”14 Mere variations in structure and 
supporting statement did not prevent a finding that proposals were dupli-
cative.15 From the outset, however, the Staff confronted proposals with 
overlapping content but differences in substantive terms.16 A proposal 
asking to establish a ceiling for executive officers and directors at twice 
the salary of the President of the United States was deemed substantially 
duplicative of a proposal to limit executive officers and directors’ com-
pensation to 150% of the President of the United States.17 The Staff 
viewed the differences in the method of calculating the ceilings as imma-
terial.18  
Duplication did not occur, however, where shareholders sought dif-
ferent outcomes. For example, the Staff determined that an initial pro-
posal recommending the establishment of a policy restricting educational 
grants was not substantially duplicative of a request to require the com-
pany to disclose educational grants. Although the subject matter over-
lapped, one sought disclosure and the other the establishment of poli-
cies.19  
Similarly, a proposal requesting that General Electric make no con-
tributions to schools employing Communists, Marxists, Leninists, or 
Maoists was not substantially duplicative of a proposal recommending 
that the corporation make no contributions to any organizations that ad-
vocated employment of Communists, Marxists, Leninists, or Maoists in 
educational institutions.20 The Staff noted that one proposal related to 
advocacy and the other to employment.21 A proposal calling for a ceiling 
on total compensation did not duplicate a proposal linking non-salary 
  
the form of a request that the Company's Board establish the specified policy. It also appears that the 
two forms of the proposal are indistinguishable in legal and practical effect.”).  
 14. PepsiCo, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 68057 (Mar. 25, 1992). 
 15. See CBS, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 13061 (July 10, 1978) (“The two pro-
posals vary in structure and supporting statements but are substantially duplicative.”).  
 16. See Stanhome Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 20482 (Jan. 10, 1997).  
 17. See Am. Elec. Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 530042 (Dec. 22, 1993).  
 18. See id. (The Staff also determined that proposals seeking limits and/or freezes on execu-
tive and director compensation substantially duplicated another that requested a cap on executive 
compensation at fixed amounts and a suspension on executive pay raises, stock option grants, and 
bonuses.). 
 19. See Garnett Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30942 (Mar. 16, 1982) (“In our 
view [the view of the Staff], however, although there appears to be some similarities between the 
proposals at issue, we do not agree that they are substantially the same. We note that the first pro-
posal recommends that the Company establish a policy restricting educational grants, while the 
second proposal seeks to require disclosure concerning educational grants.”); see also BankAmerica 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 13826 (Jan. 29, 1979) (“Mr. Ritz's proposal requests that the 
Company adopt a policy which prohibits the Company from making any new loans or renewing any 
existing loans to certain communist countries. Mrs. Cordoba's proposal, on the other hand, not only 
requests the Company to adopt a similar proposal, but also directs the Company's board of directors 
to prepare and deliver to stockholders annually a report describing the extent of the Company's 
business dealings with communist countries.”).  
 20. See Gen. Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 13810 (Jan. 24, 1979). 
 21. See id. 
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compensation and performance.22 Nor did a proposal addressing the 
compensation of directors duplicate another regarding compensation of 
management.23 
The exclusion for duplicative proposals was, however, used infre-
quently.24 The Staff excluded only six proposals under the exclusion in 
198125 and only two the following year.26 For the most part, the exclu-
sion applied to the rare circumstance of different shareholders accidental-
ly submitting substantially identical proposals.  
The exclusion remained unchanged until 1998 when the Commis-
sion redrafted the Rule into plain English and used a Q&A format.27 The 
exclusion for duplicative proposals was renumbered and received only 
“minor stylistic revisions.”28  
III. STAFF INTERPRETATION 
Entering the new millennium, the use of the exclusion changed. The 
Staff broadened the interpretation of the duplicative proposal exclusion. 
No longer limited to proposals that served “no useful purpose,” applica-
tion resulted in the exclusion of proposals with substantial and material 
differences. This could be seen with particular clarity in connection with 
proposals involving political contributions and lobbying activities.  
A. Traditional Analysis  
In the immediate aftermath of the 1998 amendments, the Staff for 
the most part adhered to a relatively narrow approach in interpreting sub-
section (i)(11). The Staff deemed proposals duplicative if identical29 or 
distinguished only by minor variations such as capitalization and 
spelling.30 Proposals could also be excluded if they addressed the same 
core issues31 or had the same “principal focus or thrust.”32  
  
 22. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra note 3.  
 23. See id.; see also Ford Motor Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 608205 (Mar. 14, 
2005) (A proposal limiting total compensation was not duplicative of one limiting stock options.).  
 24. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 19135 (Oct. 14, 1982).  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  
 27. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 23200 
(May 21, 1998). 
 28. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 39093 
(Sept. 18, 1997). 
 29. See AT&T Corp., 1999 WL 33414 (Jan. 26, 1999) (describing second proposal as an 
“exact copy” of an earlier proposal).  
 30. See United Therapeutics Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 535327 (Mar. 5, 2015). 
 31. See Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., SEC No-Action Letter 1999 WL 95481 
(Feb. 22, 1999) (This may occur even where they differ somewhat in terms or breadth. In those 
circumstances, the proposal need only “substantially mirror” an earlier submission. For example, a 
first proposal to Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. requested that the board take the “needed 
steps to prove that, at future elections of directors, new directors be elected annually and not by 
classes . . . and that on expiration of present terms of directors their subsequent election shall also be 
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Companies could not exclude proposals that, while broadly similar, 
had differing goals and requested very different actions.33 For example, 
in Exxon Mobil the first proposal requested that the company set quanti-
tative goals for greenhouse emissions.34 The second sought disclosure of 
devalued assets resulting from climate change.35 Exxon argued that the 
principal focus was climate change and the related risks.36 The Commis-
sion disagreed and did not permit exclusion.37 
Similarly, proposals seeking unique disclosures and actions, even if 
overlapping in subject matter, were not treated as substantially duplica-
tive.38 For example, a first proposal requesting quantitative goals for re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions did not duplicate a proposal requesting 
a report on carbon asset risk.39 Each proposal focused narrowly on a spe-
cific activity, although both broadly dealt with climate change.40 
  
on an annual basis. The second requested the board to “take the necessary steps to declassify the 
Board of Directors and establish annual elections of directors, whereby directors would be elected 
annually and not by classes . . . .” Although using different terminology, the Staff allowed for exclu-
sion as substantially duplicative.). 
 32. Qwest Communications Int’l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 799987 (Mar. 2, 
2009) [hereinafter Qwest]; see also Constellation Energy Grp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 
346073 (Feb. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Constellation] (This in turn occurs where the proposals have the 
same effect. In Constellation Energy Corp, a shareholder submitted a proposal requesting the board 
to develop a “performance-based equity grant program for executive officers.” The Staff agreed that 
the proposal substantially duplicated a previously submitted proposal requesting “the company to 
implement a ‘commonsense executive compensation program’” that included an equity compensa-
tion component.); Tri-Continental Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 89104 (Mar. 2, 1998) 
(Similarly, Tri-Continental received two proposals seeking to transform the company into an open-
end investment company, specifically to eliminate “the current market price discount to the net asset 
value per share of the Corporation’s common stock.” The initial proposal requested that the board 
permit the purchase or sale of shares at net asset value. The subsequent proposal recommended a 
tax-free exchange or merger with a comparable open-end mutual fund. Although somewhat different 
in approach, the proposals sought the same ultimate goal. The Staff, therefore, granted the requested 
no action relief.).  
 33. See Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 262978 (Mar. 17, 2014) [here-
inafter Exxon Mobil Corp.]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. (Compensation proposals often fall within the same broad category but have a 
different thrust and focus. Proposals relating to stock options do not necessarily duplicate those 
involving the retention of stock. Further, a policy that senior executives retain 75% of all equity-
based compensation for a minimum of two years after departing from the company is not substan-
tially duplicative of a policy barring senior executives and directors from engaging in speculative 
transactions in the company’s stock.). 
 37. See id.; see also Pharma-Bio Serv, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 6701971 (Jan. 
17, 2014) (In Pharma-Bio Serv, Inc. two proposals addressed the issuance of dividends. The first 
requested “the board establish a quarterly dividend policy” while the second requested “the board 
immediately adopt and issue a special case dividend.” Although the proposals involved the same 
broad subject matter, the Staff declined to permit exclusion as substantially duplicative.). 
 38. See Kraft Food Grp., supra note 5; see also Exxon Mobil Corp., supra note 33.  
 39. See Exxon Mobil Corp., supra note 33.  
 40. See id. (Additionally, a proposal requesting a report on lobbying contributions is distinct 
from the principal thrust of a report on political disclosures.); see also The Allstate Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2014 WL 253599 (Mar. 12, 2014); Bank of America Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2013 WL 706894 (Feb. 15, 2013); AT&T Inc., SEC No-Action Letter 2012 WL 380433 (Feb. 2, 
2012).  
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B. Political Contributions and Lobbying Proposals 
Nonetheless, the use of (i)(11) significantly increased in the second 
decade of the new millennium. In 2010, four proposals were excluded as 
duplicative, with three addressing the need for an independent director as 
chair of the board.41 A year later, the number of exclusions jumped to 
fifteen (out of 192 granted by the Staff)42 and twenty the following 
year.43   
This increase had a specific explanation. The Staff determined that 
proposals seeking disclosure of lobbying activities and proposals seeking 
disclosure of political contributions were duplicative. When companies 
received separate proposals on each of these topics, the later-received 
proposal could be excluded.44  
The approach first appeared in a no-action letter to Citigroup, Inc.45 
The bank received a proposal from the Kansas City Firefighters calling 
for the disclosure of political expenditures. Specifically, the proposal 
resolved that:  
[T]he shareholders of Citigroup (“Company”) hereby request that the 
Company provide a report, updated semi-annually, disclosing the 
  
 41. See Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 1046718 (Mar. 19, 2010); see 
also The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 943084 (Mar. 9, 2010); 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 128066 (Mar. 5, 2010); Honeywell Int’l 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 4922427 (Jan. 19, 2010).  
 42. Frank Zarb, Preparing for the 2012 Proxy Season: Looking Back at the Last Season and 
Forward to the Next, PROSKAUER (2011), http://www.proskauer.com/files/News/10a6fd8a-63f6-
48bb-bf56-2edbb2606c51/Presentation/NewsAttachment/42b80dd4-32c7-493e-a200-
2f27dc783a74/Preparing-for-the-2012-Proxy-Season.pdf.  
 43. See News Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 2127516 (July 16, 2012) [hereinafter 
News Corp.]; see also J.M. Smucker Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 1357552 (May 17, 
2012); Nabors Indus. Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 457969; Goldman Sachs Grp. Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 561908 (Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Goldman Sachs]; AT&T Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 748855 (Mar. 1, 2012); Xcel Energy Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 
WL 160557 (Feb. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Xcel]; Wellpoint, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 
160556 (Feb. 24, 2012); JPMorgan Chase & Co, SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 109888 (Feb. 24, 
2012); Johnson & Johnson, SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 605023 (Feb. 23, 2012); Chevron, 
supra note 4; Pfizer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6837552 (Feb. 17, 2012); Allergan, Inc., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 417664 (Feb. 9, 2012); Johnson & Johnson, SEC No-Action Let-
ter, 2011 WL 6837553 (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Johnson & Johnson]; Caterpillar Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2012 WL 173781 (Feb. 1, 2012); Vornado Realty Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 
WL 258592 (Feb. 1, 2012); Mylan Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 71854 (Feb. 1, 2012); 
CVS Caremark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 173779 (Feb. 1, 2012) [hereinafter CVS 
Caremark]; Union Pac. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 36454 (Feb. 1, 2012) [hereinafter 
Union Pac.]; Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6837538 (Jan. 31, 2012) 
[hereinafter Occidental]; Lockheed Martin Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6470982 (Jan. 
12, 2012); Am. Express Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6425343 (Jan. 11, 2012).  
 44. Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2013 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN (July 
9, 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-
2013-Proxy-Season.aspx. 
 45. See Citigroup Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 5179480 (Jan. 28, 2011).  
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Company’s: 1. Policies and procedures for political contributions and 
expenditures (both direct and indirect) made with corporate funds.46 
The proposal sought review by the audit committee and posting on 
the company's website.  
Thereafter, the company received a proposal from AFSCME Em-
ployees Pension Plan calling for the disclosure of lobbying expenditures. 
The proposal resolved that:  
[T]he stockholders of Citigroup Inc. . . . hereby request that Citigroup 
provide a report, updated annually, disclosing Citigroup's: 1. Policies 
and procedures for lobbying contributions and expenditures (both di-
rect and indirect) made with corporate funds and payments (both di-
rect and indirect, including payments to trade associations) used for 
direct lobbying and grassroots lobbying communications, including 
internal guidelines or policies, if any, for engaging in direct and 
grassroots lobbying communications. 2. Payments (both direct and 
indirect, including payments to trade associations) used for direct 
lobbying and grassroots lobbying communications, including the 
amount of the payment and the recipient.47 
In seeking the exclusion of the AFSCME proposal, the bank assert-
ed that both lobbying and political expenditures were “nondeductible 
expenses” under the Internal Revenue Code (the IRC) and that inclusion 
of both would result in shareholder confusion. AFSCME, however, as-
serted that the IRC drew “a number of distinctions between ‘lobbying’ or 
‘influencing legislation’ on the one hand, and, on the other hand, partici-
pation in political campaigns and other activities” and that the company 
was seeking to “lump[] together [the proposals] as part of some unitary 
view of what Citigroup calls the ‘political process.’”48 Without analysis, 
the Staff allowed for the exclusion of the proposals as duplicative.49  
  
 46. Id. (“2. Monetary and non-monetary contributions and expenditures (direct and indirect) 
used to participate or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office, and used in any attempt to influence the general public, or segments 
thereof, with respect to elections or referenda. The report shall include: a. An accounting through an 
itemized report that includes the identity of the recipient as well as the amount paid to each recipient 
of the Company's funds that are used for political contributions or expenditures as described above; 
and b. The title(s) of the person(s) in the Company who participated in making the decisions to make 
the political contribution or expenditure.”).  
 47. Id. (The proposal defined grassroots lobbying communication as a “communication di-
rected to the general public that (a) refers to specific legislation, (b) reflects a view on the legislation 
and (c) encourages the recipient of the communication to take action with respect to the legisla-
tion.”). 
 48. Id.  
 49. See id. (The first proposal “requests that Citigroup provide an annual report disclosing 
Citigroup's payments, both direct and indirect and including payments to trade associations, used for 
direct lobbying and grassroots lobbying communications and the policy, procedures, and participants 
involved in making such payments.” While the second proposal is articulated as “relying on publicly 
available data does not provide a complete picture of the Company's political expenditures. For 
example, the Company's payments to trade associations used for political activities are undisclosed 
and unknown. In many cases, even management does not know how trade associations use their 
 
322 DENVER LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 93 
In 2011, the Citigroup analysis was used as a basis to exclude a sig-
nificant number of other proposals requesting disclosure of a company’s 
political contributions or lobbying expenses. For example, in Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., a proposal requesting disclosure of lobbying contribu-
tions and communications was substantially duplicative of one request-
ing a review of political expenditures and spending processes.50  
In FedEx Corp., a first proposal sought for the board to adopt a pol-
icy permitting a shareholder advisory vote on corporate electioneering 
contributions.51 The second asked for the board to provide a report on 
policies and procedures relating to political contributions and expendi-
tures made with corporate funds.52 The proponent argued that the second 
proposal did not duplicate the first.53  
The Company mistakenly asserts that the Proposal's essential objec-
tive is to provide shareholders with information on the company's po-
litical giving; by contrast, the Proposal, from its title to its resolve 
clause is clearly intended to create an advisory shareholder franchise, 
the opportunity for shareholders to review and vote on an advisory 
basis regarding company policies and implementation regarding elec-
tioneering contributions. As such, the Proposal is not substantially 
duplicated by the earlier proposal.54  
The Staff nonetheless allowed for the exclusion of the second pro-
posal as duplicative.55 A significant number of the 2011 letters cited 
shareholder confusion as a basis for exclusion.  
In 2012, the Staff relied on the same approach to exclude other pro-
posals addressing political contributions or lobbying.56 For example, in 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. the Staff determined that a proposal on polit-
ical contributions entirely subsumed one on lobbying.57 The Staff took 
the same position in CVS Caremark Corp.58 In 2012, of the twenty-seven 
letters addressing political contributions and lobbying, and excluded as 
duplicative, nine referred to shareholder confusion.59  
  
company's money politically. The proposal asks the Company to disclose all of its political spend-
ing, including payments to trade associations and other tax exempt organizations for political pur-
poses.”).  
 50. See Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 5409422 (Feb. 25, 
2011).  
 51. See FedEx Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 3017397 (July 21, 2011).  
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. See id. 
 56. See Ford Motor Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 50596 (Feb. 15, 2011); see also 
supra note 51; General Motors Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 1125502 (Apr. 5, 2007); 
Goldman Sachs Grp., supra note 43.  
 57. See Goldman Sachs Grp., supra note 43.   
 58. See CVS Caremark, supra note 43.   
 59. See FedEx Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 1901986 (May 24, 2012); see also 
Occidental, supra note 43; CVS Caremark, supra note 43; Union Pac., supra note 43; Johnson & 
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In 2013, shareholders drafted around the Staff’s interpretation. Pro-
posals addressing political contributions disclaimed application to lobby-
ing and visa versa.60 For example, in CVS Caremark Corp., the first pro-
posal from the Clean Yield Asset Management requested a report on 
policies and procedures related to “contributions and expenditures . . . 
to (a) participate or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of (or 
in opposition to) any candidate for public office, or (b) influence the 
general public or any segment thereof, with respect to an election or ref-
erendum.”61 The second proposal from Sisters of St. Francis of Philadel-
phia requested that the board authorize the preparation of a report dis-
closing “Company policy and procedures governing lobbying, both di-
rect and indirect, and grassroots lobbying communications.”62 The sec-
ond proposal, however, specifically stated that “[n]either ‘lobbying’ nor 
‘grassroots lobbying communications’ include efforts to participate or 
intervene in any political campaign or to influence the general public or 
any segment thereof with respect to an election or referendum.”63 Given 
the explicit disclaimer, the Staff declined to find the proposals duplica-
tive and denied the requested no-action relief.64  
Where shareholders failed to make the disclaimer, the Staff has con-
tinued to treat the proposals as duplicative.65 In Union Pacific Corp. the 
Staff deemed the second proposal duplicative where the first broadly 
addressed policy and procedures related to lobbying, and the second ad-
dressed policy and procedures related to political contributions.66 This 
approach was reaffirmed again in PepsiCo, Inc., when the first proposal 
pertained to political contributions, while the second pertained to lobby-
ing, electioneering, and political expenditures.67 Despite having different 
  
Johnson, supra note 43; News Corp., supra note 43; Xcel, supra note 43; Chevron, supra note 43; 
IBM, SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 6138120 (Dec. 6, 2012). 
 60. Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2013 Proxy Season, supra note 44.  
 61. See CVS Caremark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 178208 (March 15, 2013) 
[hereinafter CVS Caremark 2013]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2013 Proxy Season, supra note 44.  
 65. Id. 
 66. See Union Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 1119680 (Mar. 30, 2012) (The 
AFSME Resolution called for a report on the company’s “policy and procedures governing the 
lobbying of legislators and regulators” and a “listing of payments . . . used for direct lobbying.” The 
proposal also sought payments to “any tax-exempt organization that writes and endorses model 
legislation” and a description of the board’s oversight of these expenditures. The Fund proposal 
sought a report on “[p]olicies and procedures for political contributions and expenditures” and con-
tributions “used to participate . . . in any political campaign.”).  
 67. See PepsiCo, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 6730888 (Jan. 29, 2014) (“The first 
proposal provides that the company shall have a policy pertaining to making political contributions 
only if such a policy is approved by at least 75% of its shares outstanding. The second proposal 
requests that the board create and implement a policy requiring consistent incorporation of corporate 
values into lobbying, political and electioneering expenditures and to report specified information 
relating to lobbying, electioneering or political contribution expenditures.”). 
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requests, the Staff determined that the second is excludable under the 
Rule.68  
In Duke Energy Corp., the Staff permitted the exclusion of the sec-
ond after finding that they both encompassed “disclosure of contributions 
and expenditures made by the Company to participate or intervene in any 
political campaign or to influence the public with respect to elections or 
legislation as well as the disclosure of the recipients and amounts paid to 
such recipients.”69 Thus, because both proposals addressed the same 
principal focus or thrust, exclusion was permitted.70 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Subsection (i)(11) was originally designed to permit the exclusion 
of proposals deemed moot. Shareholders benefited because they no long-
er needed to consider a matter already included in the proxy statement. 
As the Staff reasoned, voting on two “substantially identical” proposals 
served “no useful purpose.” For much of the history of the exclusion, the 
Staff adhered to this approach and maintained a narrow interpretation of 
the Rule in limiting exclusions.  
Over time, however, the rationalization for the exclusion changed. 
Investor confusion became the underlying justification.71 In doing so, the 
Staff effectively broadened the scope of (i)(11).72 This broad expansion 
  
 68. See id. 
 69. Duke Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 6844383 (Jan. 24, 2014).  
 70. See id.  
 71. See Verizon Communications Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 6844388 (Feb. 5, 
2014) (Thus, while Rule 14a-8(i)(11) protects shareholders from the confusion caused by substan-
tially duplicative proposals, it also protects the board from being placed in a position where it may 
be unable to properly determine the shareholders' will because the terms of such proposals are dif-
ferent, even though the subject matter is the same. As one no-action request asserted, the subsection 
“protects the board of directors from being placed in a position where the board cannot, for all prac-
tical purposes, implement the stockholders’ will because the board does not have clear terms on 
which to proceed where duplicative proposals, while sharing the same subject matter, differ as to 
terms, breadth, or intended implementation.”); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2004 WL 224539 (Jan. 30, 2004); TCF Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 7274810 
(Feb. 13, 2015) (company arguing that “[t]he rationale behind the ‘principal thrust or focus’ concept 
is that the presence in one proxy statement of multiple proposals that address the same issue in 
different terms creates the risk that, if the shareholders approve each of the proposals, the board of 
directors would not be left with a clear expression of shareholder intent on the issue.”); Centerior 
Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 82758 (Feb. 27, 1995); Pinnacle W. Capital Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 78521 (Mar. 16, 1993); Pacific Gas, supra note 3; Procter & Gam-
ble Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 28300 (June 15, 2983); Monsanto Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2000 WL 217449 (Feb. 7, 2000); General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 360097 
(Jan. 22, 2003). 
 72. David M. Lynn & Anna T. Pinedo, Frequently Asked Questions about Shareholder Pro-
posals and Proxy Access, MORRISON & FOERSTER (2015), 
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/Frequently-Asked-Questions-about-Shareholder-
Proposals-and-Proxy-Access.pdf (describing the exclusion as intending to “avoid shareholder confu-
sion and to prevent various proponents from including in proxy materials several versions of essen-
tially the same proposal.”); see also Qwest, supra note 32 (arguing that proposal should be excluded 
where “the inclusion in a single proxy statement of multiple proposals addressing the same issue in 
different terms may confuse stockholders and place a company and its board of directors in a posi-
tion where they are unable to determine the stockholders’ will.”); Kraft Foods Grp., supra note 5 
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of the Rule is exemplified by the interpretations associated with lobbying 
and political contributions. The Staff took the position that very different 
proposals dealing with these topics could be excluded if they overlapped. 
The Staff viewed them as duplicative, presumably agreeing with compa-
nies that the two proposals were confusing to investors, despite share-
holders strenuously objecting and dictionary definitions that suggested 
otherwise.73 
This perspective, based upon the desire to avoid confusion, demon-
strates a broad lack of confidence in shareholders. By relying on “confu-
sion” rather than the absence of a useful purpose, the Staff puts itself in 
the position of deciding what shareholders can and cannot understand. 
Moreover, even if proposals are adopted that have the capacity to send 
mixed messages to the board, such as an unproven assertion, they are 
invariably precatory. As a result, they do not command but merely pro-
vide information about shareholder views. Management, not the Staff, is 
in the best position to assess the meaning of the information. Yet by ex-
cluding materially different proposals as duplicative, the Staff effectively 
prevents such information from reaching the board.  
The Rule benefits from a provision that excludes duplicative pro-
posals. However, the Rule does not benefit from an interpretation of the 
concept of duplicative to exclude materially different proposals from 
consideration by shareholders. In those circumstances, the Staff effec-
tively denies rather than protects the voting rights of shareholders, the 




(“In addition, because the Sustainable Packaging Report Proposal and the Sustainability Report 
Proposal substantially duplicate the Sustainable Forestry Report Proposal, there is a strong likeli-
hood that Kraft's shareholders may be confused if asked to vote on all three proposals, as sharehold-
ers could assume incorrectly that there must be a substantive difference among the proposals.”); 
Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 890020 (Mar. 23, 2009) (“Gibson Dunn 
further states that the primary rationale behind the “principal thrust/principal focus” concept is that 
the inclusion in a single proxy statement of multiple proposals addressing the same issue in different 
terms may confuse shareholders and place a company and its board of directors in a position where 
they are unable to determine the shareholders' will. As we point out above, there is no basis for the 
argument that the inclusion of the Proposal and the Prior Proposal would create confusion for share-
holders and no basis for the argument that the company would be unable to determine the sharehold-
ers' will if one proposal were adopted and the other failed. “); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter 2002 WL 975855 (Apr. 3, 2002); Constellation, supra note 32.  
 73. See CVS Caremark 2013, supra note 61.  
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